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THE SENATE DEBATE
ON THE

Ll:A.GUE OF NATIONS

Presented by
Ann Packard

Hay 12, 1969

The Treaty of Versailles and, more importantly, the Covenant of
the League of Eations contained in that treaty have been the subjects
of much debate and speculation since their- final defeat by the United
States Senate in 1920.

This debate has centered on the question of

who was responsible for the defeat of the treaty.

Some blame Uilson

for his obstinacy in refusing to allow the Democratic senators to vote
for ratification of a treaty containinG P.epublican reservations.
Others put the responsibility in the hands of tho Republican majority
led by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge.

A number of influences shaped the

reactions and attitudes of the various senators and caused them to
vote the way they did.

As the Senate debate unfolded the position of

ea.ch indivic1ual senator and of factions within the Senate became
increasingly clear.
President )Jilson began talking and writing about a league of nations
before the United States even entered tho war with Germany.

As early

as 1914 he suggested that all nations should become pa.rt of an international association designed to maintain peace in the world.

Eis

January 1917 speech to Congress elaborated a number of points, includine
one on the establishment of a league of nations, that were later incorporated into his Fourteen Points address, delivered in early 1918.

His

war message on April 2, 1917 and a message to the Russian people in I1ay
of the same year also expressed his belief in the need for an international peace organization that would be setlup at the peace co:ri.f erence
at the end of the war.l

2

Opposition to Wilson's proposed program came primarily from the
Republican camp, especially the Republican members of the Senate.

Henry

Cabot Lodge, Minority Leader of the Senate and ranking Republican on
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had been opposed to '\'Tilson' s
league idea since the beginning of 1917.

He felt it contained too many

new ideas that could be dangerous for American interests. 2 As the war
progressed Lodge was joined by other Republican senators who felt that
Wilson's power should be curbed and that control of the country's
policies should be returned to Congress where it had been before the
great increase in presidential power due to the war.

The severity of the

attacks on Wison and his policies during the Congressional election of
1918 prompted him to go before the country and appeal for a vote of
confidence.

He asked the voters to return a Democratic majority to both

houses of Congress in order to allow him to conduct the peace negotiations as he had proposed and to continue the programs he had already
begun.

The Republicans took this appeal as a direct insult to their

abilities and as a challenge concerning who really represented the
country.

The election of a Republican Senate in November, although only

by a majority of two seats, seemed to them to indicate that the public
had repudiated the President's leadership and was demanding a change)
1·lilson' s determination to go to Paris himself as a peace negotiator
and his failure to appoint any senators, either Republican or Democrat,
to the peace commission despite the outcome of the election served to
crystallize the growing Republican opposition in the Senate.

Even

before the treaty was submitted to the Senate for ratification the

3
members had split into three camps:

the irreconcilables, who were

opposed to the treaty in any form: the mild reservationists, who
supported a leaQJ.e of nations in principle but desired amendments to the
league as proposed by Wilson; and the senators, almost all Democrats,
who supported the league exactly as it was brought from Paris by Wilson.
Henry Cabot Lodge, now Majority Leader and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, attempted to hold together the Republican majority,
made up of members of all three camps, in order to prevent Wilson from
achieving his goal.

The Republicans were determined not to allow Wilson

to gain any more prestige or power over governmental affairs.

They

wanted to reassert the control of Congress after the great gains in
presidential power made

durin~

the war and to prevent Hilson from

gaining more personal glory both at home am abroad.

':Tilson was equally

as determined that the treaty would be ratified exactly as it was
presented to the Senate.
the Democratic

~inority

All throuEh the debate he continued to instruct
to vote against any reservations or amendments

introduced by the Republicans.

As a result of the bickering the treaty

was voted down by the Senate twice in ITovember 1919, once by the opposition of the Democrats to the treaty with the Lodge reservations attached
and once by the Republicans voting against an unamended treaty.

The

treaty was brought back for reconsideration at the next session of Congress

(1920) and again defeate2 for tho final time. 4
Virginia had three different senators involved in the league debates,
Thomas S •. Hartin, Claude A. Swanson, and Carter Glass.

1·fartin, 1,fuo had

been elected to his fifth term in the Senate in 1918, was in line to
become Democratic floor leader in the 66th Congress.

~Tilson was opposed

4
to 1".artin' s election because of Hartin' s opposition to Hilson' s nor:tlnaof 1Cj10l •
tion at the Democratic National Convention. °'.'Jhen Martin saw his support
dwindling he withdrew from the race and John
elected.

~T.

Kern of Indfa.m:. was

The Wilson.lMartin feud ended at this point.

A great believer

in and supporter of party unity, Martin supported most of

~'Filson'

s

programs simply because the two men were of the same political party.
Wilson also buried the hatchet and made a special effort to win I-:artin 1 s
support because he needed every vote he could get to carry out his
programs.5

In 1916 Hartin was elected Majority Leader and continued

to serve as head of the Democratic party in the Senate until his death,
He took no actual part in the debates on the league due to his absence
from the Senate in the early stages.

Having been taken seriously ill in

the early part of June 1919, he died on Eovember 12, 1919, just one -vreek
before the league was voted on for the first time.

His ability to keep

the Democratic senators in line and his mastery of parliamentary procedure
were sorely needed in the struggle with the Republican majority over the
league.

As early as June people recognized that Hartin 1 s absence was a

definite disadvantage to the Democrats trying to carry out Hilson 1 s
peace policy.6
Claude A. Swanson, also a leader of the Democratic machine in
Virginia, was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Com.rnittee.
·,"' 1"11a

Although he too originally voted against 'l·lilson at the convention,_ he
became an active campaigner for 1·lilson and a staunch supporter of Wilson's
policies.

He was chosen to give the opening speech for the administration

in the treaty fight and had a number of conferences with
discuss strategy.?

~Iilson

to

5
Appointed by Governor Westmoreland Davis to fill the vacancy in the
Senate caused by the death of Senator Hartin, Carter Glass acceptod his
new position the day before the first vote on the treaty nas taken but
did not actually assume his seat until February 1920.

~Ie

therefore

missed most of the inter-party wrangling over the treaty and the league.
His intimate friendship with

~'lilson,

stemming from his sponsorship and

guidance of the Federal Reserve System bill in the House and his term
as Secretary of the Treasury, was an added factor in his unfailing support
of ·wilson 1 s peace- program.
Ifore ·ifn:_)ortant than tho fact thn.t thP. league was defeated is the
part played by certain
defeat.

individuals~

and groups in

bringin~

about this

Everyone had his own idea on what the league and the treaty

meant or would mean to the United States and to the international situation.

At times these ideas came in conflict with each other and made

av-eement on the treaty difficult if r.i.ot impossible.

Wilson 1 s o•,m

attitude toward the league was particularly uncompromising.

He

s::i.w

the

League of Hations as absolutely essential to the preservation of world
peace and United States participation in the lear:;ue as the only means
whereby the league would be effective.

In addition, this league nrust be

formed at the peace conference in order to insure that all nations would
join and aEree to follow the principles set forth by -:·Iilson,

His idealistic

attitude toward the league and what it could accomplish was not shared by
the other negotiators.

Both Great Britain and France tried to write into

the peace treaty more provisions to benefit themselves and to protect
themselves from future German a13gression.

They also tried, with some

success, to prevent adoption of amendments desired by American public

6
opinion that they felt would weaken the parts of the treaty they already
donsidered too weak.

They were finally forced to back d01m on their

claims somewhat by Wilson's threat to pack up and leave if tho peace
principles uere not accepted. 8
J U...l'-j l Cj l Cf
Hhen 1Jilson returned homo.A. he ·i;,ras faced with another fie;ht to get
IV\

the treaty ratified by the Senate so that the United States could become
a member of the League of

~fations.

As the Senate fight progressed it

became more and more apparent that Wilson 1vas unwilling to accept any
amerdments or reservations to the league, not even those proposed by
members of his own party.

After he had been asked to compromise

nun:erous times, he answered his opponents by saying that he had no moral
right to accept changes in son:ething that had already been sic::ncd.

To

accept reservations would be highly detrimental to the country's honor
and would lose the United States nmch of its prestie:e abroaa.9

Then

too, accepting Ar.ierican reservations r.iight induce the other countries to
try to gain concessions they had been unable to achieve before.

l·~any

people contended that. if the United States Senato added amendments or
roserYations, the treaty would have to be resubmitted to the peace
conference, giving the other countries a chance to propose new amendments.

This would also create problems idth the Allies' ability to force

the peace settlement on Germany.

This is one of the reasons 1·!ilson

considered anything but acceptance of the treaty exactly as it stood as
a nullification of the treaty, the league, and the principles behind them.
The ideas of the Democratic minority loyal to Wilson on the treaty
were somewhat mixed, especially in the later stages of the debate.
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opinion that they felt would weaken the parts of the treaty they already
donsidered too weak.

They were finally forced to back down on their

claims somewhat by :·lilson' s threat to pack up and leave if tho peace
principles uere not accepted. 8
'"'Ju..\'-'; tti tC!

Hhen '-Tilson returned home,\, he -was faced with another fir,ht to get
the treaty ratified by the Senate so that the United States could become
a member of the League of

~fations.

As the Senate fight progressed it

became more and more apparent that Wilson 1vas umr.Uling to accept any
amerdments or reservations to the league, not even those proposed by
rr..embers of his own party.

After he had been asked to compromise

nunierous times, he answered his opponents by saying that he had no moral
right to accept changes in so:rr:ething that had already been sic:-ned.

To

accept reservations would be highly detrimental to the country's honor
and would lose the United States much of its prestie:e abroaa.9

Then

too, accepting American reservations might induce the other countries to
try to gain concessions they had been unable to achieve before.

l·~any

people contended that. if the United States Senato added amendments or
reservations, the treaty would have to be resubmitted to the peace
conference, giving the other countries a chance to propose neu amendments.

This would also create problems with the Allies' ability to force

the peace settlement on Germany.

This is one of the reasons '.·!ilson

considered anything but acceptance of the treaty exactly as it stood as
a nullification of the treaty, the league, and the principles behind them.
The ideas of the Democratic minority loyal to Wilson on the treaty
were somewhat mixed, especially in the later stages of the debate.

7
At first most of the Democrats supported 'Tilson whole-heartedly despite
any personal reservations they might have had to his demands for passage
of the treaty exactly as it was submitted to the Senate.

The division

along party lines on many of the votes, such as those on the fall
----rv> "'Y'.\ a..s
amendments and the appeals to the Senate on Vice-President" Ear shall ts
rulings, indicates the extent to which the Democrats followed ',Jilson 1 s
desires. lO

Si·;ranson' s statements on the ?all amsindm8nts arc fairly

roprosentative of the Democratic attitude to the treaty.
against all of these amendments.

Siranson voted

To him, amending the treaty meant

that it would have to be sent back to the conference for acceptance in
its new form, causing a long delay in implementation of the treaty and
ostablishment of the league.

Ho felt that the United States had an

obligation to the other countries to see that the treaty was properly
carried out; therefore, no restrictions shor;r.a be put on United States
participation on any commission set up by the treaty, as adoption of some
of the ?all amendments would have done.

Swanson also announcod that if

Senator Hartin had been present he too c·rould have voted against all tho
amendments. 11

Swanson 1 s views reflect somewhat :-Tilson 1 s idealistic

belief in the necessity of United States participation in the league if
it was to succeed.

He also emphasized tho urgent need for a quick

acceptance of the treaty so that its provisions could be put into practice immediately to alleviate the chaotic .situation in

T~urope.

There were, however, some members of the Democratic uing in the
Senate who, unlike Swanson, came to feel that unquestioning support of
T·!ilson was not necessarily in the best interests of the country.

As

long as they thought the president would accept whatever kind of treaty

8

the Senate was willing to pass even if it were not in the form ho had
requested, the Democrats would stand by Hilson and 'Tote as he wished.
After his statement of early !!:arch saying that he would refuse to accept
any reservations then being considered by tho Senate tha Democrats
realized that the situation was hopeless.

They had to decide either to

stick with '.Tilson and defeat the treaty or to desert him and take the
best terms they could get under the circumstances.

Ea'1y of the Democrats

did not approve of the president 1 s attitude toward the tree.ty.

They

considered him fanatically attached to an ideal that the rest of the
world was unready to accept.

The advocates of reservations were only

trying to safeguard America by guaranteeins her continued sovereignty;
they were not attempting to prevent tho actual establishment of a
league.

12

As evidenced py the final vote taken

l~arch

19, 1920, twenty-

one Democratic senators, having decided that an amended treaty was
bettor than no treaty at all, voted against :'!ilson 1 s leadership by voting
for the approval of the amended treaty. 1 3 Sven this was not e'1ough to
bring about passage of the treaty,

It failed to obtain a two-thirds

majority and was sent back to Hilson with a note to the effect that the
Senate refused to consent to it.
w•.,.,.

The irreconcilables or bitter-enders, led by Senators, Borah and \l~1\c...v":.kvKnox, were the most vocal in their opposition.

They were against any

mention of a league in the peace treaty and took the initiative in the
debate in the weeks and months before any details of the settlement were
knovm in the United States.

The activity of this adamant group gave the

unmistakable impression that the treaty was going to be a partisan issue.
f6~+ex

Although .Senator :LfoCumber, the only Republican who voted for ratification
-i

9
no matter what the terms, tried to cJnvince the public that the Republican
party as a whole was not opposed to a league, the pro-league Republican
faction was strangely silent.

It allowed the irreconcilables to get the

upper hand at the very beginning and made it impossible for the party to
unite on any of the crucial votes later.

Ifot even Senator Lodge with his

great abilities as a leader was able to get the irreconcilables to
adhere to the program of reservations supported by the Republican
. •tY• 14
maJori

The question of whether Lodge really wante d a treaty with

reservations or whether he personally sided with the irreconcilables is
not particularly relevant to this discussion and will not be taken uu
here. 15
Lodge was the leader of the mild reservationists, those who were
for a league in principle but who were unwilling to accept T;:ilson 1 s
league.

They felt that certain amendments would have to be made to

',Tilson 1 s proposal before it would be acceptable.

!1ost of the changes

involved were simply measures to insure the continued sovereignty of the
United States over its international relations and to guarantee that
Congress would retain its constitutional control over the president.

The

key argument of the mild reservationists for reservations seemed to be
the safeguarding of American ideals and security.

During the July

debates Senator Lenroot based his entire justification of the necessity
of reservations on tho upholding of the principle of "Americanism'' and the
need for clarifying a number of points that many senators felt

rr~ght

later

jeopardize the position of the United States. 16 Although all of the
amandments introduced failed to receive a two-thirds majnrity, the Lodge
reservations were approved and attached to the resolution of ratification

10
before any of the final votes were taken, (Pote:

an amen:::lment could be

attached only to the original treaty; a res8rvation, often containing the
same revision as a previously proposed and defeated amendment, was
attached to the ratification resolution to serve as an indication of
conditional acceptance.

Both had the same purpose, to prevent the

treaty from being adopted in the form in which i t was proposed.)

The

inability of the mild reservationists to get the Republican irreconcilables to agree to a joint program or to gain anything but token support
from the Democrats made it impossible for the treaty with reservations
to pass.

lfoither could the Democrats muster a majority for their program.

The wb.ole situation was a total impasse.
':lith the Senate divided into three camps one might assume that the
number of votes for and against various proposals made durin8 the debates
would vary considerably, depending on the measure being voted on and the
combining of two of the factions on one side or the other.
instances this turned out not to be the case,

In r..ost

The voting split was

almost exclusively on the basis of partisanship, straight DemocratRepublican, with the exception of a very few senators who completely
switched sides and voted as if they were loyal members of the other
party.

Party politics was one of the major factors in shaping the

attitudes of many of the senators toward the treaty and the league.

They

gave no real thought to what either the treaty or the league meant and
blindly followed the party leaders 1 dictates.

This made their stand at

times inconsistent and unrealistic.
The hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee '\·!ere a prime example
of the role of partisanship in steering the course of the treaty.

President

11

Hilson had presented the treaty to the Senate on ,July 10, 1919, in a
speech in which he tried to explain the nature of the provisions and to
give reasons for the quick approval of the treaty.

Democrats generally

were very enthusiastic about the effect of the speech,

Swanson called

it. 11 magnificent, able, eloquent and inspiring" arrl said that "The reasons
presented for the ratification of the treaty, including
nations, were strong, cogent and unanswerable."
were highly critical, accusing

~Tilson

~he

league of

Nost of the Republicans

of explaining the general principles

behind the treaty and neglecting the specific details.

Borah claimed

that Hilson refuted his own statement about it being a 1eague to enforce
peace by stating that the league was "an alliance for warr'~ 1 7

Swanson

a.ttempted to defend Wilson by asserting that it was not expected or
possible to discuss details of the league in a speech of the kind given
by \iilson,

The audience lacked the background knowledge and the technical

experience to be able to grasp these details from such a short mention
of them. 18
The Senate referred the treaty to the Foreign Relations Corn..1'Jli ttee
where the Republicans immediately began a complete reading aloud of the
treaty in order to give themselves time for the formulation of amendments.
Lodge also requested additional information from :Iilson on the treaties
with Poland and France, information which, according to Lodge, uas
absolutely vital to further consideration of the treaty. 19 The Democrats
on the com,'llittee were against any delay in consideration.

At first they

did not think it was necessary to request more information from the
President, but they finally consented to ask ~-Tilson for the treaty with
Poland and b:ro agreements on the Rhine •20 At the same time Lodge proposed

12
/

O"l)

c;._ bct\<e

0f

C-a>'ft..,...iw>; be+...11J.•~<1-. "J(;..l'W.'I\
~Vl

an amendment regarding the provision an Shantung,A Swanson objected
vigorously to this beginning in the middle of the treaty.

d

CJ...1 l<(I.,

He felt that

the committee should begin by considering the league provisions and work
straight through in order until it reached the end.

To Swanson, jumping

in the middle at Shantung made it appear that a majority of the cormnittee
was tryine: to pick out something to make it clear that the majority's
object was the defeat of the treaty.

Swanson voiced the hope that a

majority of the whole Senate would not support this particular amendment.
He ·was confident that enough Republicans would vote uith the Democrats
21
to defeat it.
Perhaps Swanson was closer to the truth than he was
willing to admit even to himself.

It is possible that the Republicans

were trying to show the Senate that it was useless to try to get any kind
of treaty except the one the Republicans ·were willing to allow.

At any

rate, this exchange does serve to show the partisan character of the
struggle.
As the Foreign Relations Committee finally ordered the treaty
reported back to the Senate it contained approximately forty-five amendments and four reservations, most of which had been approved by a vote of
nine to eight, the Republican-Democrat split of the committee·.

The

majority report refuted all the charges of unnecessary delay leveled against
the committee and said there would be no problem in getting the amendments
approved by the other powers since the conference was still in session
in Paris.22

The report also requested immediate Senate approval on all

amendments and reservations in order to protect American interests.
acceptance of this recommendation, however, would have meant virtual

Total

lJ
rejection of the league as far as the United States was concerned.
These provisions took away what little control the league would have had
and gave the final decision in any controversy to the Congress.
The minority committee report, introduced by Senator Hitchcock,
!1inority Leader of the Senate, and signed by all Democratic merrbers of
the committee except Shields, demanded immediate ratification of the treaty
without amendments or reservations and charged the majority members of
the

coM.i~ittee

with obstructing the treaty.

The report stated that the

reservations were introduced solely for the purpose of destroying the
league and nullifying the treaty. 23 Obviously this charge-trading did
nothing to ease the animosities between the two sides; on the contrary,
it more than likely tightened the lines and made i t even more difficult
to achieve a middle grotind.

One of the points it should have begun to

make clearer was that the issues were not being decided on their o•m
merit.

The senators were not really considering what would be in the

best interests of the United States or of world peace.

They might have

thought and said they were, but in reality the issues were being decided
on the basis of party politics,
Partisanship continued to dowinate the debates and the voting in the
Committee of the

~·Jhole

in the Senate.

In an editorial in :mid-October

the Richmond Times-Disoatch quoted Senator Hitchcock as having stated
public.ly ./ that he was assured of forty Democratic senators who would
vote against ratification of the treaty if it were weighed d01m with
reservations.

This statement played right into the hands of the Repub-

licans, especially the irreconcilables.

If the treaty were defeated the

blame 1-rould be put on the Democrats even though the Republicans were the

14
ones to whom it was unacceptable in the first place.

Hitchcock's

announcement was an open invitation to the Republicans to load the treaty
down with amendments and reservations in order to make it more onerous
to the Democrats. 24

This example shows how party politics distorted the

issues and turned the whole question of the league into a farce.

The

league was not being discussed on its own terms but on the basis of what
one party or the other thought about it.

The complete reversal of party

support from what one would expect to find indicates the ridiculous
lengths a group of men would to to in rallying around the

~tandard

of

party loyalty.
Despite his earlier statement, Hitchcock continued to claim that,
even though the Democrats would vote against the treaty with reservations,
the treaty was by no means dead.

If the Lodge reservations were defeated ,

the Democrats would off er a resolution asking ratification of the
unamended treaty.

If that also failed, the way would then he open for a

co:mpromise resolution that would permit passage of the treaty.

Hitchcock

believed that he could muster enough votes to get the treaty in a deadlock and make this compromise possible. 25 Considering the extreme
partisanship that characterized the debate over the treaty Hitchcock's
position was a little ludicrous if not do'lmright naive.

He never explained

how he intended to effect this compromise and he seemed not to grasp
the difficulties in his plan.
A further partisan dispute rose out of Hitchcock's plan to try to
get a compromise resolution.

TheRepublicans questioned whether the

treaty would still technically be under Senate consideration after having
been defeated twice already.

According to the rules of the Senate further

15
consideration depended on the ruling of the presiding officer, in this
case Vice-President Marshall, a Democrat.

Marshall stated that he would

allow another ratification resolution in the interests of reaching a
compromise.

The Republicans objected

vi~orously,

saying that a simple

m['jority vote could overrule the presiding officer's decision and that
they had enough votes to do so should Yarshall allow another resolution, 26
This "tlms precisely what did happen.

Lodge objected to lfarshall 1 s ruling

that the treaty be brought back for reconsideration in the Committee of
the qhole,

The question was put to a vote in which the Senate overruled

the decision on a straight party vote, putting reconsideration in the
Senate itself instead of the Committee,
to forty-three

r~arshall'

The Senate also overruled fifty

s ruling that amendments could be made to the

Lod~e reservations when they were brought back for reconsideration. 27
In an editorial published two days after the first two defeats of
•I

II

the treaty, the Richmond Times-Dispatch took an I-told-you-so attitude
toward the whole subject.

The editorial stated that the Democrats had

been outma"'new.vered in the parliamentary proceedings and had been forced
into the position of having "to vote for a resolution that so restricted
the treaty in its operation as virtually to destroy its original vitality,
or else assume responsibility for its defeat."

It was a trap set by the

Republicans which the Democrats deliberately walked into on the chance of
getting a vote on an unreserved ratification resolution ·and/or Republican
support for a compromise.

The paper criticized the Democrats for not

being willing to yield to reservations that would not have really hurt
the treaty at a time when it would st.ill have been possible for enough

16
Republicans to join them in saving the treaty and the league.

By the

time the Democrats realized they had to make s.ome concessions the
Republicans had a plan and were not about to change their minds. 28

The

editorial grasped very succinctly the heart of the whole problem of
ratification.

Neither side was willing to bend or take the first step

for fear of losing party support or of being accused of disloyalty.

No

one really considered what would have to be done to effect a compromise
because no one ever really expected the debate to reach a stage where
compromise would have been possible.

Subsequent events seem to support

this contention that compromise was never really possible.
In

1'1 <W
mid-February~the

Republicans took the initiative in bringing

the treaty containing modified Lodge reservations back to the Senate.
They believed there would be little or no opposition to these reservations, since they had been proposed by the mild reservationists.

Hitch-

cock gave up on trying to get Democratic modifications to these
reservations.

As long as the situation was still controlled by the

f{epublicans they were the ones who would have to take the initiative to
modify the treaty so that it would be acceptable to the Wilson
supporters. 29 The Republicans were unwilling to modify the reservations
to suit the Democrats.

According to the Republicans, any reservations

acceptable to the Wilson supporters would be too watered-down to achieve
the purpose for which they were proposed by the Republicans.

It was

readily apparent that the only hope of ratification lay in a serious
break of the administration forces.

As the final vote approached, the

Republ.ican leaders hoped that, if ratification failed on the first
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attempt and a second attempt was made, after making their opposition a
point of recordJenough Democrats would come over to the reservationist
camp and save the treaty from complete failure,30

A number of Democrats

did bolt on the final vote but not enough to obtain ratification of the
treaty.
Another thread inextricably woven with that of party politics was
~-Tilson'

s participation in and guidance of the whole league fight,

He

was the strongest advocate of an unamended treaty and was determined
that no one was going to prevent him from achievinE his goal,

Hilson

maintained such strong control over the Democratic membors of the Senate
that the leaders could neither make a proposal nor accept or reject one
made by the opposition without first consulting Hilson.

From the very

beginning Wilson was adamant on getting the treaty his own way or not
getting it at all.

In June 1919 the Senate cabled 1:Tilson in Paris and

asked him to officially Ydease the contents of the treaty to them before
he returned to the United States,

A number of Wall Street businessmen

already had a copy of the treaty and were using it to their own advantage,
·.-;ilson refused, saying he had promised not to release the treaty until
he could lay it before the Senate in person.

As soon as he did return

he held a long conference with Senator Swanson, who was to :open the
debate in the Senate,

There was no record made of their conversation,

but it was quite possible that rn.::Son suggested to Swanson the major points
to be included in his speech.

Swanson also made clear his own feeling

that few amendments or reservations would be passed,

He based this

assumption on the fact that, given Wilson's intense desire to see the
treaty passed without reservations and his power of rejecting the treaty

18
as reported by the Senate if it displeased him, a majority of the Sen1te
would be willing to go along with

~Tilson 1 s

idea.

During the hearings in the Foreign Relations Com."llittee

entire

t~e

com."llittee went to the White House to confer with Hilson on some aspects
of the peace negotiations knmm only to him.

The Republican members of

the committee were rather dissatisfied with the answers
their questions.

~·J"ilson

gave to

They had been hoping to get supporting evidence from

Filson for some of their grievances against the treaty.
gave

~Tilson

Instead, they

an opportunity to present his side of the picture and to

inspire his supporters to fight more·- fiercely to defeat any amendments. 3l
The Republican leaders said that the treaty would never pass without
some kind of reservations, but Wilson remained adamant on unreserved
\(~':.\

ratification.

He would not even give his approval to

Senator~Pittman 1 s

proposal for interpretive reservations that would be kept separate from
the actual ratification resolution.

Pittman's proposal was allowed to

die by the rest of the Democratic leadership because Pittman had failed
to get it approved by Hilson before announcing it.3 2
By early September, however, ':·Tilson had begun to change somewhat

his attitude toward reservations.

He was still completely opposed to

any changes that would involve sending the treaty back to Paris, but he
also stated that he would not oppose interpretive reservations if they
were absolutely necessary.

The -president did not consider any of the

amendments or reservations already proposed as belonging to the second
category and noted a definite drift to reservations other than interpretive. 33
wore on.

This last observation became more and more true as the debate
After the defeat of the Fall amendments by the opposition of the
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Democratic minority, the Republicans almost conceded that there would
be no amendments passed.

Instead, they turned their attention to

pushing for reservations to the ratifying resolution.
At first the Democrats were uncertain as to how far they would go
in opposing these reservations.

All through the fight over the amendments

they had solidly supported viilson 1 s program of ratification of a treaty
that would not have to be resubmitted to the peace conference.

If they

remained loyal to this principle, and there was no reason for them not
to, they would also vote against any reservations that were unacceptabls
to the administration.

\mile the Lodge reservations were bcinrr debated

the Democrats decided to ask ~Tilson whether to vomfor ratification of
the treaty if the reservations were passed,

They ·wanted to put the entire

decision in ';Jilson' s lap and were willing to abide by his decision whatever it mie;ht be .J4 Hilson told the Democratic leaders that the reservations were trying to

ac~omplish

the same ends as the previously defeated

amendments and were, therefore, unacceptable to him.

The President

maintained this attitude until the very end, when all hope of ratification
was past.

He even threatened to take.the treaty back and lock it up in

his desk if the reservations were passed without being modified

)5 The

Democrats attempted to introduce substitute reservations which ;:-:ere
either turned dovm by Hilson

a~

unacceptable or defeated by the

Republicans.
~Tilson'

s whole attitude during the hearine;s and debates was obstinate.

an:::. unrelenting.

He was absolutely determined that the peace was going

to be his peace or no peace at all.

He could not exercise any real control

over the Republicans, but he could and did dictate to the Democrats.
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Because the Democrats were willing for the most part to vote the way
"Wilson wanted ther.i to vote, they never really stopped to consider the
ir.iplications of their actions.

It does not appear that any of them really

understood what the treaty or the league meant in terms of the future,
the international situation, or the position of the United States.

Hhen

it finally began to dai-m on them that they were in a hopeless situation
and that there was almost no possible outcome except defeat of the treaty,
a little less than half of the Democratic membership decided any treaty
was better than no treaty at all, regardless of what the President or
anyone else said, and voted for ratification,

Unfortunately, seven more

votes were needed for passage, but they were not forth corning.
of the Democrats stuck with

~Tilson

The rest

and permitted tho treaty to die on

the Senate floor. 3 ~
The failure of the compromise program was due in largo measure to
~Tilson 1 s

insistence that he have first approval on any proposal made by

or to the Democrats.

Both sides attempted a number of times to reach

some kind of compromise, but none of the atteripts '1rere successful.
Although both Republicans and Democrat.s said they were hopin£ for a
compromise resolution of ratification, neither group was willing to keep
a really open mind or modify its conditions sufficiently to achieve a
compromise.

Party politics, as well as i1ilson 1 s unyielding attitude,

played a major part in keeping the lines firm and in preventing any kind
of agreement.
The Democrats started off 'with a qualification to any type of compromise that might be proposed.

They could only accept modifications or
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reservations that Hilson would approve.

Swanson indicated, after his

talk with Wilson on July 10, that the Democrats Hould support certain
reservations as long as these changes did not reake the covenant superficial or take away all of its real meaning.37

The stipulation obviously

limited the ability of the Democratic leaders to bargain with the opponents
of the treaty for a settlement that would be acceptable to both sides.
Dy early Hovember it had become obvious that the Democrats were
getting nowhere in their ratification fight.

Hilson had continued to

ignore those senators who told him, as did Senator

~fatson

(Rep.) of

Indiana, that the only way to get the Unitod States into tho Loaguo of
~fations

was to accept the Lodge reservations,

He refused to even listen

to any reservations that would, as he put it, "nullify" the league.

With

the situation becoming more hopeless every day, Hitchcock went to visit
r.frlson.

His task was to tell Hilson that the Democrats could not raise

even a simple majority, much less the required two-thirds, fo1ratification of the treaty without reservations.

He urged the President to

compromise on the Lodge proposals as the only means of getting the United
States into the league.

Hilson answered emphatically to let Lodge do

the compromising if any were to be done.

3itchcock then suggested that

perhaps Lodge 1·1ould do this if the President indicated in some way that
he was willing to make peace with the Tiepublicans.
suggestion was complete indignation.

Hilson's reply to this

Se told Hitchcock that the first

r:i.ove and most of the concessions would have to come from Lodge, not from
any Democrat, especially himself. JS

Granted that 1:lilson was a sick man

and might not have understood exactly how bad the situation was, this was
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still a rather astounding position for the President to take.

His

refusal to make any effort at compromise, when failure to do so meant
almost certain defeat of a measure that he saw as the only means of
achieving world peace, seems to be completely inexplicable.
Despite this adamant refusal the Democrats made another attempt to
find out what the President would accept in the way of reservations.

Thoy

asked Lodge to write doim what he would ask for if Hilson agreed to
accept private terms given by Lodge.

This list of terms Fas sent to tho

"'ihite House, but it was never mentioned ac;ain by either side.

Lodge took

this lack of a reply as the final insult and ceased making any attrimpt to
bargain with Wilson.

Hitchcock realized that there was no way to pass

the treaty as the President wanted it.

By

securin~

the support of the

mild reservationists, who only wanted safeguards on the uso of United
States troops, he hoped to be able to bring about passage of a modified
treaty.39 With this end in mind the mild reservationists started a
compromise move that would have permitted acceptance of the reservations
of the Foreign Relations Committee without the requirerient that they
had to be approved by the other powers.

This would have eliminated one

of Wilson's major objections'.: to the reservations.

At the same time the

mild reservationists announced that they were not entirely opposed to
modification of the committee reservations but that they would vote
LtQ

against the administration!s program.'

In a last ditch effort Lodge and Hitchcock held a conference just
prior to the first vote on the treaty.

At this conference they agreed to

allow a vote to be taken on unreserved ratification before the vote on
the corr.!nittee resolution of ratification containing the Lodce reservations.
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This was What the Democrats had been fighting for all the time.

In

return the Democrats submitted to Lodge a proposed set of compromise
reservations showing the modifications necessary to obtain Democratic
support for the reserved treaty.

Lodge insisted that all compromise

efforts had to be made before any vote was taken on the committee
resolution. 41

Clearly Lodge wanted to know for exactly what concessions

the Democrats were asking before he went into the final debate and vote.
He was confident the Republicans could defeat the resolution of
unreserved ratification no matter When it was voted on.
_ in agreeing to have it voted on first.

He lost nothing

Be probably saw it as civine: hiP'l

a certain psychological advantage over his opponents since he had refused
to accept the modified reservations proposed by '.Iitchcock.

If the

Democrats saw that their unreserved resolution had failed and realized
that the choice was a reserved treaty or no treaty at all, enouch of
them might have been willing to vote for the reserved treaty to obtain
its passage.

Lodge's mai\eu..vers did not work in November, but the

situation in March followed his reasoning almost exactly.
Developments between November and March brought no real chanEe in
the status of the compromise efforts. _ A bipartisan committee attempted
to draft a set of reservations that would be acceptable to a two-thirds
majority of the Senate.

It was almost prevented from meeting by

Senator Lodge, who tried to keep the com.mttee under his thumb because
he feared it might upset his plans.

At the same time a g:roup of thirty

Democratic senators met and declared themselves in favor of interpretive
reservations.

Some of these Democrats accepted a number of the Lodge

reservation, and it appeared that the treaty might pass on the votes of
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these Democrats and the Republican mild reservationists,

The irrecon-

cilables prevented this, however, by threatening to repudiate Lodge's
leadership.

Lodge was forced to give in and to agree that the reserva-

tion would remain as they were introduced,

The bipartisan conference

committee broke up ·over the reservation to Article
Nations Covenant,

( Lol\e<:.-hue. !.c.c.~~')

X~of

the League of

The Democrats were 1rillinP'u to accent
the Taft
•

rewording of Lodge's original proposal, but LodQ:e was forced by the
irreconcilables to refuse even this concession. 42

Party politics

prevented Lodge from accepting a compromise that had a fairly

~ood

chance of being passed,
In February Carter Glass, new junior senator from Vire;inia, made
another attempt at a compromise,

After talking 1·.rith many Republican

senators, he discovered that they were willing to back down on their
~Tilson would aP-"ree
wlr.":.h """'' "'"-""'\'j a.. \e.».>o~a'°"'J ~-!he.

demands if

to accept the Taft reservation to Article X1

""':'.i"''a..l 1-od')~ ru;;cvvcdiCYI +t> +\..Ill.

ax+\c.ll!,.,

He wrote to Uilson agreeing that it would be a betrayal of the Democratic
Party to accept the Lodge reservations but pointing out that the party
ffiUst be able to say it tried every possible means to compromise short
of completely destroying the treaty,

If the Taft reservation uere

proposed by the Democrats and then votf!!d doim by the Republicans,
responsibility for defeat of the treaty would rest on the Republicans,
not on the Democrats,

Promising that

~·Tilson'

s name would be kept com-

pletely out of the discussion, Glass asked for 1.rilson' s approval before
introducing the reservation.

':Tilson 1 s reply questioned the good faith

of Taft's proposal and stated that the Democrats takinG the initiative at
this point llas probably all wrong.43

Glass said that his sug~estion was

not intended to change the Democrats 1 stand, only to sound out the
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?.epublicans: however, if the President felt it irould be detririEJntal to
the party, he would drop the whole subject.

Again a Democrat,

a~ainst

his own better judgment, had bowed to the wishes of the President.
The lack of understanding of what the peace treaty, and especially
the League of Nations, really meant or could have meant to the United
States seemed to affect most of the senators, President Wilson, and
a large portion of the general public.

Partisanship and a certain

naivete characterized the entire Senate debate on the treaty.

Eost

of the senators labored under some kind of preconception about the
treaty and the league.

They saw the league as either the greatest

hope for world peace or as an instrument for involving the United
States in squabbles in which it had no real interest.

Because of these

preconceptions and the partisanship none of the men involved in
consideration of the Treaty of Versailles had a very realistic picture
of the treaty or the League of Nations.

Perhaps if they had been

more willing to keep an open mind and to consider the treaty objectively
the outcome might have been different.

At the very least the treaty

would have received a fairer hearing and, if defeated, would have been
voted down on its mm merits or lack thereof.
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